In Defense of Comic Pluralism

Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of...

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Главный автор: Sharadin, Nathaniel (Автор)
Формат: Электронный ресурс Статья
Язык:Английский
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Опубликовано: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2017]
В: Ethical theory and moral practice
Год: 2017, Том: 20, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 375-392
Индексация IxTheo:NCA Этика
VA Философия
Другие ключевые слова:B Юмор (мотив)
B Aesthetic judgment
B Comic moralism
B Incongruity theory
B Comic immoralism
Online-ссылка: Volltext (Verlag)
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Описание
Итог:Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of a joke can affect its comedic value both positively and negatively.
ISSN:1572-8447
Второстепенные работы:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9784-3