Belief and the Error Theory

A new kind of debate about the normative error theory has emerged. Whereas longstanding debates have fixed on the error theory’s plausibility, this new debate concerns the theory’s believability. Bart Streumer (2013) is the chief proponent of the error theory’s unbelievability. In this brief essay,...

ver descrição completa

Na minha lista:  
Detalhes bibliográficos
Authors: Forcehimes, Andrew T. (Author) ; Talisse, Robert B. 1970- (Author)
Tipo de documento: Recurso Electrónico Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
Verificar disponibilidade: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Carregar...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publicado em: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2016]
Em: Ethical theory and moral practice
Ano: 2016, Volume: 19, Número: 4, Páginas: 849-856
Classificações IxTheo:NCA Ética
VA Filosofia
Outras palavras-chave:B Belief Formation
B Error Theory
B Reasons
B Bart Streumer
B Belief Maintenance
Acesso em linha: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Descrição
Resumo:A new kind of debate about the normative error theory has emerged. Whereas longstanding debates have fixed on the error theory’s plausibility, this new debate concerns the theory’s believability. Bart Streumer (2013) is the chief proponent of the error theory’s unbelievability. In this brief essay, we argue that Streumer’s argument prevails against extant critiques, and then press a criticism of our own.
ISSN:1572-8447
Obras secundárias:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9707-8