Peter Auriol on Free Choice and Free Judgment
Some medieval authors defend free choice by arguing that, even though human choices are indeed caused by the practical judgment about what is best to do here and now, one is nevertheless able to freely influence that practical judgment’s formation. This paper examines Peter Auriol’s account of free...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Brill
2015
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| Στο/Στη: |
Vivarium
Έτος: 2015, Τόμος: 53, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 65-89 |
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | KAF Εκκλησιαστική Ιστορία 1300-1500, Ύστερος Μεσαίωνας NBE Ανθρωπολογία VA Φιλοσοφία |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Freedom
free choice
intellect
will
Peter Auriol
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| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Σύνοψη: | Some medieval authors defend free choice by arguing that, even though human choices are indeed caused by the practical judgment about what is best to do here and now, one is nevertheless able to freely influence that practical judgment’s formation. This paper examines Peter Auriol’s account of free choice, which is a quite elaborate version of this approach and which brings its theoretical problems into focus. I will argue in favor of Auriol’s basic theory, but I will also propose an emendation to his theory in order to respond to some problems he leaves unresolved. |
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| ISSN: | 1568-5349 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | In: Vivarium
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15685349-12341291 |