On the alleged failure of free will theodicies: A reply to Tierno
In a recent issue ofSophia Joel Tierno contends that free will theodicies are fundamentally flawed insofar as they claim to provide an adequate explanation for God’s permission of moral evil. Free will, according to Tierno, only accounts for our ability to make certain choices that issue in evil, bu...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Опубликовано: |
Springer Netherlands
2003
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| В: |
Sophia
Год: 2003, Том: 42, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 99-106 |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Human Freedom
B Adequate Explanation B Free Action B Free Agency B Moral Evil |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Итог: | In a recent issue ofSophia Joel Tierno contends that free will theodicies are fundamentally flawed insofar as they claim to provide an adequate explanation for God’s permission of moral evil. Free will, according to Tierno, only accounts for our ability to make certain choices that issue in evil, but fails to account for the fact that we often do make such choices. However, the argument developed by Tierno, despite its initial appeal, embodies an important misunderstanding of the nature of free will theodicies and in particular the libertarian conception of human freedom customarily employed by these theodicies. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/BF02782401 |