Second thoughts on the alleged failure of free will theodicies
In this paper I further the discussion on the adequacy of free will theodicies initiated by Joel Tierno. Tierno’s principal claim is that free will theodicies fail to account for the wide distribution of moral evil. I attempt to show that, even if Tierno need not rely on a compatibilist conception o...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Springer Netherlands
2004
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| Στο/Στη: |
Sophia
Έτος: 2004, Τόμος: 43, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 87-93 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Human Freedom
B Adequate Explanation B Wide Distribution B Negligible Probability B Moral Evil |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | In this paper I further the discussion on the adequacy of free will theodicies initiated by Joel Tierno. Tierno’s principal claim is that free will theodicies fail to account for the wide distribution of moral evil. I attempt to show that, even if Tierno need not rely on a compatibilist conception of free will in order to substantiate the aforementioned claim, there remains good reason to think that free will theodicies are not explanatorily inadequate in the way suggested by Tierno. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/BF02780513 |