Using, risking, and consent: Why risking harm to bystanders is morally different from risking harm to research subjects
Subjects in studies on humans are used as a means of conducting the research and achieving whatever good would justify putting them at risk. Accordingly, consent must normally be obtained before subjects are exposed to any substantial risks to their welfare. Bystanders are also often put at risk, bu...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2020]
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| Στο/Στη: |
Bioethics
Έτος: 2020, Τόμος: 34, Τεύχος: 9, Σελίδες: 899-905 |
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NCJ Επιστημονική Ηθική |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Informed Consent
B Bystanders B Means principle B Risk B human subjects research B research ethics |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Πιθανολογούμενα δωρεάν πρόσβαση Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Σύνοψη: | Subjects in studies on humans are used as a means of conducting the research and achieving whatever good would justify putting them at risk. Accordingly, consent must normally be obtained before subjects are exposed to any substantial risks to their welfare. Bystanders are also often put at risk, but they are not used as a means. Accordingly—or so I argue—consent is more often unnecessary before bystanders are exposed to similar substantial risks to their welfare. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12743 |