Public goods and the paying public

This paper proposes a way to undercut anarchist objections to taxation without endorsing an authoritarian justification of government coercion. The argument involves public goods, as understood by economists and others. But I do not analyse options of autonomous prisoners and the like; for, however...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Byrne, Edmund F. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 1995
In: Journal of business ethics
Year: 1995, Volume: 14, Issue: 2, Pages: 117-123
Further subjects:B Undercut
B Public Good
B Market Transaction
B Good Argument
B Economic Growth
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Summary:This paper proposes a way to undercut anarchist objections to taxation without endorsing an authoritarian justification of government coercion. The argument involves public goods, as understood by economists and others. But I do not analyse options of autonomous prisoners and the like; for, however useful otherwise, these abstractions underestimate the real-world task of sorting out the prerogatives of and limits on ownership. Proceeding more contextually, I come to recommend a shareholder addendum to the doctrine of public goods. This recommendation involves modifying the public goods argument for government coercion to include a contributor-specific compensation provisio, thinking of contributors as investors, and including among the latter those whose investment is in the form not of a market transaction strictly speaking but of sacrifice. To reach this recommendation I constrain the market liberal's limited endorsement of taxation by drawing on the (idealized) postcommunist privatizer's continuing commitment to populism.
ISSN:1573-0697
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/BF00872016