Luck, Risk and the Market

This paper explores how luck egalitarianism fares in capturing our intuitions about the fairness of market-generated outcomes. Critics of luck egalitarianism have argued that it places no restrictions on what outcomes are acceptable, at least when all agents are equally situated before entering the...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:  
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Lazenby, Hugh (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Verificar disponibilidad: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Gargar...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publicado: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2014
En: Ethical theory and moral practice
Año: 2014, Volumen: 17, Número: 4, Páginas: 667-680
Otras palabras clave:B Luck Egalitarianism
B Markets
B Risk
B Responsibility
Acceso en línea: Volltext (JSTOR)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Descripción
Sumario:This paper explores how luck egalitarianism fares in capturing our intuitions about the fairness of market-generated outcomes. Critics of luck egalitarianism have argued that it places no restrictions on what outcomes are acceptable, at least when all agents are equally situated before entering the market, and that this gives us a reason to reject it as an account of fairness. I will argue that luck egalitarianism does make specific judgements about which market-generated outcomes are compatible with maintaining a fair distribution. In addition, I will argue that luck egalitarian prescriptions accord with our pre-theoretical intuitions about the (un)fairness of certain market-generated outcomes. Securing these points both speaks in favour of luck egalitarianism as an ethical principle and provides a framework within which to analyze the fairness of practical, real world cases.
ISSN:1572-8447
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-013-9454-z