When Is Inequality Fair?
Recent literature on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism has suggested that an opposition to unchosen inequality on the grounds of unfairness is compatible with a range of accounts as to which inequalities are fair. I argue that forms of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism face a challenge i...
Главный автор: | |
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Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
Язык: | Английский |
Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Опубликовано: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2018]
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В: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Год: 2018, Том: 21, Выпуск: 5, Страницы: 1205-1218 |
Индексация IxTheo: | NCC Социальная этика VA Философия |
Другие ключевые слова: | B
Luck Egalitarianism
B Desert B Equality B Responsibility B Справедливость B Inequality |
Online-ссылка: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Resolving-System) |
Итог: | Recent literature on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism has suggested that an opposition to unchosen inequality on the grounds of unfairness is compatible with a range of accounts as to which inequalities are fair. I argue that forms of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism face a challenge in the construction of such accounts; namely to explain the fairness of such inequalities specifically, as opposed to their being merely justified in a broader sense. I illustrate the nature of this challenge through an interesting parallel with an issue in value theory in the form of the so-called 'wrong kind of reason' problem. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9963-x |