Egalitarianism Reconsidered
This paper argues that egalitarian theories should be judged by the degree to which they meet four different challenges. Fundamentalist egalitarianism, which contends that certain inequalities are intrinsically bad or unjust regardless of their consequences, fails to meet these challenges. Building...
| Authors: | ; |
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| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| 出版: |
Brill
2011
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| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2011, 卷: 8, 發布: 4, Pages: 567-586 |
| Further subjects: | B
Justice
B Equality B 公平 B Egalitarianism |
| 在線閱讀: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| 總結: | This paper argues that egalitarian theories should be judged by the degree to which they meet four different challenges. Fundamentalist egalitarianism, which contends that certain inequalities are intrinsically bad or unjust regardless of their consequences, fails to meet these challenges. Building on discussions by T.M. Scanlon and David Miller, we argue that egalitarianism is better understood in terms of commitments to six egalitarian objectives. A consequence of our view, in contrast to Martin O’Neill’s “non-intrinsic egalitarianism,” is that egalitarianism is better understood as a family of views than as a single ethical position. |
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| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/174552411X601067 |