Indignation, Appreciation, and the Unity of Moral Experience
Moral experience comes in many flavors. Some philosophers have argued that there is nothing common to the many forms moral experience can take. In this paper, I argue that close attention to the phenomenology of certain key emotions, combined with a clear distinction between essentially and accident...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2022
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2022, Volume: 25, Issue: 1, Pages: 5-19 |
Further subjects: | B
Blameworthiness
B Moral emotion B Moral Experience B Indignation B Appreciation B Praiseworthiness |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | Moral experience comes in many flavors. Some philosophers have argued that there is nothing common to the many forms moral experience can take. In this paper, I argue that close attention to the phenomenology of certain key emotions, combined with a clear distinction between essentially and accidentally moral experiences, suggests that there is a group of (essentially) moral experiences which in fact exhibits significant unity. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-021-10214-3 |