Appreciation as an Epistemic Emotion
In this paper, I develop an account of appreciation. I argue that appreciation is an epistemic emotion in which the subject grasps the object in an affective way. The "grasping" and "feeling" components implies that in appreciation, we make sense of the object by having cognitive...
Autore principale: | |
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Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
Lingua: | Inglese |
Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Pubblicazione: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2022
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Anno: 2022, Volume: 25, Fascicolo: 2, Pagine: 249-264 |
Altre parole chiave: | B
Appreciation
B Understanding B Epistemic emotion |
Accesso online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Riepilogo: | In this paper, I develop an account of appreciation. I argue that appreciation is an epistemic emotion in which the subject grasps the object in an affective way. The "grasping" and "feeling" components implies that in appreciation, we make sense of the object by having cognitive control over it, are motivated to maintain the valuable epistemic state of understanding, and experience the "aha" or "eureka" moment. This account offers a unified account of the many types of appreciation, including the aesthetic, the moral, and the epistemic. In all these cases, appreciation requires some other first-order emotions as prerequisite. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Comprende: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-021-10265-6 |