Rethinking the Person-Affecting Principle
In Rethinking the Good, Larry Temkin argues for a principle that he calls the Narrow Person-Affecting View. In its simplest formulation, this principle states that a first outcome can be better than a second outcome only if there is someone who fares better in the first outcome than in the second. T...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2015
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| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2015, Volume: 12, Issue: 4, Pages: 428-461 |
| Further subjects: | B
Larry Temkin
B transitivity B non-identity problem B Derek Parfit B Mere Addition Paradox B Person-Affecting View |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | In Rethinking the Good, Larry Temkin argues for a principle that he calls the Narrow Person-Affecting View. In its simplest formulation, this principle states that a first outcome can be better than a second outcome only if there is someone who fares better in the first outcome than in the second. Temkin argues that this kind of principle gives us reason to reject the Transitivity Thesis, according to which, if A is better than B, and B is better than C, then A must be better than C. In this paper, I argue that the various formulations which Temkin has offered of the Narrow Person-Affecting View all face serious problems. I then propose an alternative view that captures the spirit of Temkin’s formulations while avoiding their difficulties. I conclude by arguing that, even if we accept such a person-affecting view, we needn’t reject the Transitivity Thesis. |
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| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/17455243-01204004 |