Towards an action-guiding theory of human rights
What are the main conditions that any theory of human rights should satisfy to guide action? If agents must take action for a fairer world as human rights discourse suggests, this is a crucial question to reflect upon. In this paper, I make a proposal. I argue that any theory of (moral) human rights...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
2023
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| En: |
Journal of global ethics
Año: 2023, Volumen: 19, Número: 2, Páginas: 206-220 |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Action
B Duties B Human Rights B action-guiding theory |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | What are the main conditions that any theory of human rights should satisfy to guide action? If agents must take action for a fairer world as human rights discourse suggests, this is a crucial question to reflect upon. In this paper, I make a proposal. I argue that any theory of (moral) human rights that guides action on the basis of correlative duties must satisfy three key conditions. The first condition is focused on the specification of act-types, the second concerns the distribution of correlative duties, and the third is focused on the resolution of (resolvable) conflicts of human rights. I show that this proposal has substantive implications because it implies to reject, challenge and, in some cases, resist ideas that are commonly accepted in the literature on human rights. |
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| ISSN: | 1744-9634 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Journal of global ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/17449626.2023.2206822 |