Skepticism and Objective Contexts: A Critique of DeRose

In this paper I contrast my contextualist account of Cartesian skepticism with Keith DeRose’s account. I agree with DeRose that when the Cartesian skeptic and her opponent meet in the same context, their claims are truth-value-less. But I agree with him on the basis of a different conception of cont...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Mion, Giovanni (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2013
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2013, Volume: 3, Issue: 2, Pages: 119-129
Further subjects:B Cartesian skepticism closure principle for knowledge epistemic contextualism single scoreboard semantics
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Description
Summary:In this paper I contrast my contextualist account of Cartesian skepticism with Keith DeRose’s account. I agree with DeRose that when the Cartesian skeptic and her opponent meet in the same context, their claims are truth-value-less. But I agree with him on the basis of a different conception of context sensitivity. According to DeRose, the content of context sensitive expressions in general, and of knowledge in particular, is personally indicated. By contrast, I think that the content of context sensitive expressions in general, and of knowledge in particular, is objectively determined by the goals of the conversation and the environment in which the conversation takes place.
ISSN:2210-5700
Contains:In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-02021061