On the Standards-Variantist Solution to Skepticism
The skeptical puzzle consists of three independently plausible yet jointly inconsistent claims: (A) S knows a certain ordinary proposition op; (B) S does not know the denial of a certain skeptical hypothesis sh; and (C) S knows that op only if S knows that not-sh. The variantist solution (to the ske...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Brill
2017
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| Στο/Στη: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Έτος: 2017, Τόμος: 7, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 173-198 |
| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Σκεπτικισμός
/ Επιστημονική λογική
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| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
epistemic contextualism
standards variantism
position variantism
skepticism
pragmatic penetration
intellectualism
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| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Σύνοψη: | The skeptical puzzle consists of three independently plausible yet jointly inconsistent claims: (A) S knows a certain ordinary proposition op; (B) S does not know the denial of a certain skeptical hypothesis sh; and (C) S knows that op only if S knows that not-sh. The variantist solution (to the skeptical puzzle) claims that (A) and not-(B) are true in the ordinary context, but false in the skeptical one. Epistemic contextualism has offered a standards-variantist solution, which is the most prominent variantist solution on the market. In this paper, I argue that the standards-variantist solution in general (and the contextualist solution in particular) is epistemically uninteresting. Proponents of the variantist solution should opt for the position-variantist solution instead. I will discuss some important implications of my findings. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00001224 |