An Argument for External World Skepticism from the Appearance/Reality Distinction
In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her concl...
| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Lade...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Brill
2016
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2016, Band: 6, Heft: 4, Seiten: 368-383 |
| normierte Schlagwort(-folgen): | B
Außenwelt
/ Skeptizismus
/ Erscheinung
/ Wirklichkeit
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| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
appearance/reality distinction
contextualism
external world skepticism
knowledge closure
skeptical hypotheses
|
| Online Zugang: |
Vermutlich kostenfreier Zugang Volltext (Verlag) |
| Zusammenfassung: | In this paper, I argue that arguments from skeptical hypotheses for external world skepticism derive their support from a skeptical argument from the distinction between appearance and reality. This skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction gives the external world skeptic her conclusion (i.e., that S doesn’t know that p) without appealing to skeptical hypotheses and without assuming that knowledge is closed under known entailments. If this is correct, then this skeptical argument from the appearance/reality distinction poses a new skeptical challenge that cannot be resolved by denying skeptical hypotheses or knowledge closure. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Enthält: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00503001 |