The Coherence of Luck Egalitarianism

One of the foremost egalitarian theories in recent years, luck egalitarianism, has recently been subjected to the charge that it is in fact incoherent. This charge is brought by David Miller who highlights two dimensions of luck egalitarianism: on the one hand a commitment to the justice of certain...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:  
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Elford, Gideon 1980- (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Verificar disponibilidad: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Gargar...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Publicado: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2017]
En: Ethical theory and moral practice
Año: 2017, Volumen: 20, Número: 3, Páginas: 617-626
Clasificaciones IxTheo:NCC Ética social
VA Filosofía
Otras palabras clave:B Justice
B Coherence
B Luck Egalitarianism
B Equality
B Justicia
Acceso en línea: Presumably Free Access
Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Descripción
Sumario:One of the foremost egalitarian theories in recent years, luck egalitarianism, has recently been subjected to the charge that it is in fact incoherent. This charge is brought by David Miller who highlights two dimensions of luck egalitarianism: on the one hand a commitment to the justice of certain inequalities arising from responsible choices; on the other a commitment to injustice of brute inequalities. The putative incoherence emerges in cases where the inequalities that justice requires on the basis of individuals' responsible choices also entail brute luck inequalities for which there are the very same grounds of justice to condemn. Here I argue that the charge of incoherence against luck egalitarianism fails. In service of this I clarify the quite specific sense in which luck egalitarianism requires inequalities and demonstrate the coherence of this with its condemnation of other inequalities.
ISSN:1572-8447
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9802-5