The Problem of Evil Remains Logically Binding
Most contemporary discussions of the problem of evil assume that “logical” formulations of the problem are untenable, and that we should operate with “evidential” formulations instead. I argue that this consensus is founded on a mistake and that there is no legitimate reason to abandon logically bin...
Autor principal: | |
---|---|
Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado em: |
MDPI
[2021]
|
Em: |
Religions
Ano: 2021, Volume: 12, Número: 3 |
Outras palavras-chave: | B
Mackie
B evidential B Sterba B problem of evil B Plantinga B logical |
Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Resumo: | Most contemporary discussions of the problem of evil assume that “logical” formulations of the problem are untenable, and that we should operate with “evidential” formulations instead. I argue that this consensus is founded on a mistake and that there is no legitimate reason to abandon logically binding formulations of the problem of evil. I conclude by arguing that, though it is possible to formulate a genuinely “evidential” problem of evil, logical formulations of the problem of evil are preferable in all cases. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 2077-1444 |
Reference: | Kommentar in "Sixteen Contributors (2021)"
|
Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Religions
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3390/rel12030154 |