Eudaimonism and the Ground of Normative Reasons
This essay develops an argument against eudaimonism in support of John Hare's earlier critique of eudaimonism. In contrast to Hare, who mounts a Kantian-Scotist objection to what he calls a single-source view of motivation in eudaimonism, my critique of eudaimonism focuses on the ground of norm...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado em: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2022
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Em: |
Journal of religious ethics
Ano: 2022, Volume: 50, Número: 1, Páginas: 84-102 |
Outras palavras-chave: | B
John Duns Scotus
B Eudaimonism B Enjoyment B Normative reasons B Egoism |
Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Resumo: | This essay develops an argument against eudaimonism in support of John Hare's earlier critique of eudaimonism. In contrast to Hare, who mounts a Kantian-Scotist objection to what he calls a single-source view of motivation in eudaimonism, my critique of eudaimonism focuses on the ground of normative reasons in eudaimonism while also taking a page from Scotus's ethics. I argue that the main issue with eudaimonism is with the ultimate end and manner of our willing, which fails to correspond to the right ordering of love based on the nature of goodness in the object. |
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ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/jore.12382 |