God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds

According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why didn’t God allow creatures the freedom req...

Descrizione completa

Salvato in:  
Dettagli Bibliografici
Autore principale: Chen, Cheryl K. (Autore)
Tipo di documento: Elettronico Articolo
Lingua:Inglese
Verificare la disponibilità: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Caricamento...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Pubblicazione: MDPI [2021]
In: Religions
Anno: 2021, Volume: 12, Fascicolo: 4
Altre parole chiave:B James Sterba
B Molinism
B Hugh McCann
B J.L. Mackie
B Open Theism
B Free will defense
B theological compatibilism
B Alvin Plantinga
B problem of evil
B David Lewis
Accesso online: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Volltext (kostenfrei)
Descrizione
Riepilogo:According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why didn’t God allow creatures the freedom required for moral goodness, while intervening to ensure that all evil-doing is victimless? More recently, James Sterba has revived the playpen problem by arguing that an omnipotent and benevolent God would have intervened to prevent significant and especially horrendous evil. I argue that it is possible, at least, that such divine intervention would have backfired, and that any attempt to create a world that is morally better than this one would have resulted in a world that is morally worse. I conclude that the atheologian should instead attack the free will defense at its roots: either by denying that the predetermination of our actions is incompatible with our freely per-forming them, or by denying that the actual world—a world with both moral good and evil—is more valuable than a world without any freedom at all.
ISSN:2077-1444
Riferimento:Kommentar in "Sixteen Contributors (2021)"
Comprende:Enthalten in: Religions
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.3390/rel12040266